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2Abstract 
 
How prepared are the Scottish public to respond to the major social and economic 
innovations required by the ambitious Climate Change (Scotland) Act? Secondary 
analysis of data from the Scottish Environmental Attitudes and Behaviours Survey 
2008 is used to appraise levels of awareness and knowledge of climate change, as 
well as views on personal responsibility, consumption, energy and car use, and 
willingness to change. Although climate change is a concern shared by the majority, 
in everyday life it typically remains a back of the mind issue, and there is little 
evidence of broad practical engagement with the emissions reduction targets. It is 
argued that social values are critical to public responses to the legislation, but core 
values of individualism, consumerism and unregulated economic growth are obstacles 
to the major changes envisaged. Implementing Scotland’s Climate Change legislation 
will require a transformational politics grounded in civil society, which can challenge 
entrenched divisions, manage distributional conflicts and recognise the concept of the 
common good.  
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"Climate change is one of the most serious threats we face. Urgent action is needed to 
cut emissions which cause climate change. The Scottish Climate Change Bill will 
introduce a target to reduce emissions by 80 per cent by 2050, and a statutory 
framework to support delivery." Rt Hon Alex Salmond MSP, First Minister of 
Scotland, September 2008 
 
"We have passed an historic, groundbreaking bill that sets an international example 
that we hope others will follow." Rt Hon Alex Salmond MSP, First Minister of 
Scotland, June 25, 2009 
 
On June 24, 2009 members of the Scottish Parliament passed unanimously the 
Climate Change (Scotland) Bill. The Act, which received Royal Assent on 4 August 
2009, is an extraordinary statement of intent, and certainly one of the most ambitious 
pieces of legislation enacted by any Parliament. Its aim is for Scotland to contribute 
prominently to societally-organised, global attempts to govern, and adapt to, human-
induced changes to the Earth’s climate. The legislation, and related policies in 
Scotland, the UK, Europe, and the UN, mark the social construction of the Earth’s 
climate as a system to be deliberately and reflexively managed through coordinated 
action. The feasibility of the ambition is contested on political, economic and cultural 
grounds, but planetary climate is nevertheless firmly on the public agenda as a matter 
for governance.  
 
The rationale for such legislation is grounded in scientific evidence of accelerating 
global warming, stemming from human-induced increasing concentrations of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere: CO2 emissions since 2000 are higher than those 
predicted by the more extreme IPCC 2007 estimates, Arctic sea ice is melting much 
faster than predicted and sea levels are rising more rapidly (G8+5 Academies Joint 
Statement, 2009). Advances in climate system modelling highlight major risks, 
including higher frequency of extreme weather, coastal loss, severe drought, floods, 
crop failure and major loss of species (see for example the Met Office/UK 
government interactive map showing predicted damage of a 4degreeC rise in global 
4average temperature 
http://www.actoncopenhagen.decc.gov.uk/content/en/embeds/flash/4-degrees-large-
map-final accessed 22/10/09). The anticipated impacts have prompted global concern 
about the viability of societies with an economic infrastructure reliant on energy from 
fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas), and natural resource consumption beyond the 
sustainable capacity of the planet (Hulme, 2009; IPCC, 2007; Simms and Smith, 
2008).  
 
Attempts to govern climate are however characterised by deep disagreement: about 
authority and responsibility, accurate measurements of emissions and equivalences 
between greenhouse gases, the scale of risks, the effectiveness of carbon markets vs 
carbon taxes, and shares of costs and benefits. Global governance ambitions are 
coordinated by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and have centred on means for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
from human activity, with the espoused goal of limiting average increases in 
temperature to no more than 2C. The Kyoto Protocol, initially agreed in 1997, has 
been the key device of multilateralism. It treats the nation state as the main actor, 
adopting a hierarchical model of climate governance (Hulme, 2009), which has 
attracted both praise and criticism. Member states of the EU have so far proved the 
most willing to set explicit emissions reduction targets. The Climate Change 
(Scotland) Act is notable for its ambition, with targets for reducing emissions by 42 
per cent (from 1990 levels) by 2020, with an 80 per cent reduction target for 2050. 
Scottish Ministers are required to set annual targets from 2010 to 2050 and to report 
regularly to Parliament. The Act includes provisions relating to adaptation, forestry, 
energy efficiency and waste reduction as well as public engagement.  
 
The envisaged transformation in energy and consumption infrastructures is without 
precedent: the Stern Review (2006) for example notes that the UK 1990s ‘dash for 
gas’ in electricity generation resulted in annual greenhouse gas emission reductions of 
only 1%, and this measure of ‘reduced emissions’ was achieved only by excluding the 
increased emissions from international shipping and aviation. In addition, although 
the record shows the UK as having already exceeded its 2012 Kyoto target of a 12.5% 
reduction relative to 1990, measured CO2 emissions have in fact increased since 
2002, despite the introduction of the UK Climate Change Programme in 2000. Prior 
5to this period, UK reductions can be attributed to closures in the coal industry, and the 
off-shoring of emissions from energy-intensive steel and other manufactured goods to 
countries such as China and India (Helm et al 2007).  
 
This raises questions about the viability of the Climate Change (Scotland) Act and 
whether Scottish government and society can meet the targets. The Scottish 
legislation has courageously set a higher interim target (42% reduction relative to 
1990 levels) than the UK 34% target. The EU is committed to cut its emissions to 
20% below 1990 levels by 2020, increasing this to 30% if an international agreement 
is reached at the December 2009 UNFCCC Copenhagen conference. UK-wide 
instruments, such as the Carbon Reduction Commitment and Renewable Heat 
Incentive, are consequently oriented to at best a 34% target, with the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme geared to a reduction of between 20-30%. The UK government has 
no Scottish ministerial representation at the 2009 Copenhagen negotiations to replace 
the Kyoto Protocol (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/8276246.stm accessed 
6/10/09), and UK delegates are in turn constrained to support the EU negotiating 
stance. The Scottish government does not control energy, fuel or vehicle regulation 
and taxation, or energy efficiency standards for manufactured goods. It does however 
control building standards and planning regulations, enabling considerable control 
over energy infrastructure, and it can use public finances to shape economic activity 
and investment. Nevertheless this means that the Scottish government is working to 
targets which are not straightforwardly within its competency to deliver, placing 
significant emphasis on the need for transformation through wide public commitment 
and action to achieve targets.  
 
So how prepared are the Scottish public to respond to the major social and economic 
innovations implied by implementing such measures, and does Scottish public 
opinion differ from the rest of the UK? Do people commonly give high priority to 
concerns about natural, or environmental, resources, and to what extent do the public 
regard themselves as knowledgeable about climate change and its implications for 
societal security and well-being? Is there evidence that people are making changes to 
habitual patterns of consumption and do they regard themselves as having any 
responsibility for tackling carbon emissions? 
 
6What is Known about Scottish Environmental Attitudes and Behaviours? 
These questions are examined through secondary analysis of a subset of the data from 
the government-sponsored Scottish Environmental Attitudes and Behaviours Survey 
(SEABS08), accessible from the UK Data Archive. Based on a quota sample of the 
Scottish adult population (aged 16+), the survey provides systematic, representative 
evidence about Scottish attitudes and behaviour. Face to face interviews, with 3,054 
people, were conducted by Ipsos MORI in respondents’ homes between 18 August 
and 15 November 2008. The findings are reported in detail in Davidson, et al (2009). 
The focus here is on interpretation of these data in relation to questions about current 
public awareness, assumptions about responsibility, and the potential for societal 
change of the kinds implied by the legislation. Some comparisons of attitudes and 
awareness in Scotland and England are made using summary findings from the 2009 
Defra survey1 of English public attitudes.  
 
How Salient are Environmental Issues - Glass Half Empty or Glass Half Full?  
A decade of intensive EU, UK and Scottish government policy-making and 
information about environment, energy, waste and climate change have not resulted in 
universal awareness of environmental degradation as a critical cause for concern 
among the Scottish, or English, public. In SEABS08, when asked about the important 
issues facing Scotland or the world, 12% of respondents mention environmental 
issues spontaneously as important for Scotland, and 27% mention them as important 
for the world. The majority (61%) did not mention the environment at all. This is 
similar to the 59% of English respondents who do not mention any environmental 
issues in the 2009 Defra survey.  
                                                
1 The 2009 Public attitudes and behaviours towards the environment survey follows previous surveys 
since 1986. The spring 2009 survey, commissioned jointly by Defra and the Energy Saving Trust, 
consisted of 2,009 face to face interviews in people’s homes.  Additional questions were included in an 
omnibus survey consisting of 1,772 face to face interviews.  Both the main survey and omnibus survey 
were administered by TNS Global Market Research. Full report: 
www.defra.gov.uk/evidence/statistics/environment/pubatt/ (accessed 6/10/09).  
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Table 1: Salience of environment as an 
important issue 
Mention the environment as the single most 
important issue facing Scotland  
4  
 
Mention the environment as one of the most 
important issues facing Scotland   
8  
 
Mention the environment as the single most 
important issue facing the world  
14  
 
Mention the environment as one of the most 
important issues facing the world   
13  
 
Do not mention the environment at all 
   
61  
base  3,054 
 
Concern about environmental matters is differentially distributed in the Scottish 
population. The higher the socio-economic status of the respondent, the more likely 
they were to refer to environmental issues. Similarly, in relation to level of education, 
half of those with a degree, or equivalent professional qualification, name 
environmental issues as important, compared with one quarter of those with least 
educational qualifications.  
 
Table 2: Salience of Environment by Socio-economic Group  
Socio-economic group 
Salience of Environment  
A B C1 C2 D E Total N 
Environment an 
important issue in 
Scotland 
 
% within SEG 28.8% 16.9% 13.7% 8.9% 8.8% 7.3% 368  
Environment an 
important issue in 
world 
 
% within SEG 36.4% 34.4% 30.9% 23.3% 19.8% 18.5% 819 
Environment not 
mentioned 
 
% within SEG 
34.8% 48.7% 55.4% 67.8% 71.4% 74.2% 1867 
 
Total N 66 575 915 631 511 356 3054 
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Neither age nor sex of respondents produced much variation.  Modelling both social 
class and level of educational attainment together indicates that the effect of socio-
economic status is somewhat stronger than education2. It is worth pointing out, 
however, that among those with degrees around half do not regard environmental 
issues as a significant cause for concern, and among those in the highest social class 
the figure is around one-third.  
 
How Much Do People Claim to Know about Climate Change? 
A similar pattern was evident when survey respondents were asked explicitly how 
much they knew about climate change, although this time education had a stronger 
effect than social class, possibly as a result of asking people about their level of 
knowledge. Just under half (48%) of all respondents stated that they knew a lot or a 
fair amount, while the remaining 52% claimed to know ‘not very much’ or nothing at 
all, suggesting that for a significant proportion of the population, there is limited 
awareness of discussion about climate change. Awareness in England seems 
somewhat higher, with around 60% per cent of respondents to both the 2007 and 2009 
                                                
2 Using binary logistic regression, and reference categories highest social class and 
highest levels of educational attainment, the beta coefficient for the lowest social class 
reduces from 1.685 to 1.302 when education is introduced in the model, whereas the 
lowest education category reduces from 1.062 to .648.  
Table 3: Salience of environment by highest level of qualification  
Highest level of qualification obtained  
Salience of Environment 
Degree, 
prof 
HNC/HND 
or equiv 
Higher, A 
level or 
equivalent 
Standard 
or 
equivalent None Total 
Environment an 
important issue in 
Scotland 
% within level of 
qualification  17.7% 15.1% 15.0% 9.5% 6.4% 366 
Environment an 
important issue in 
world 
% within level of 
qualification  32.7% 31.6% 31.1% 23.6% 19.7% 807 
Environment not 
mentioned 
 
% within level of 
qualification  49.6% 53.3% 54.0% 66.9% 74.0% 1836 
 
Total N 776 272 441 798 722 3009 
9Defra surveys saying they knew ‘a lot’ or ‘a fair amount’ about the term climate 
change3. 
 
Table 4: ‘On another topic there is a lot of talk these days about climate  
change.  How much, if anything, would you say you know about it? 
 Percent 
A great deal 5.3 
A fair amount 43.0 
Not very much 39.5 
Have heard of it but know nothing about it 10.2 
Have never heard of it 1.3 
Don't know .6 
 
base 3054 
  
Differences between social class and levels of education 
As with concern about environmental issues, those in more affluent households, and 
those with higher levels of educational qualifications, were more likely to claim a lot 
or a fair amount of knowledge.  
 
Table 5: Knowledge about climate change by level of qualification  
Highest level of qualification  
Knowledge about climate change 
Degree, 
prof 
HNC/HND 
or equiv 
Higher, A 
level or 
equivalent 
Standard 
or 
equivalent None 
Know a great deal or a 
fair amount 
% within level of 
qualification  
75.0% 60.7% 55.9% 37.4% 24.6% 
Know not very much 
or nothing 
% within level of 
qualification  
25.0% 39.3% 44.1% 62.6% 75.4% 
 
Total N 773 270 438 792 714 
 
                                                
3 Question wording in the Defra Surveys was slightly different from SEABS08: people were asked: 
‘how much if anything would you say you know about the following terms?  
 Climate change (to always appear first in the list)  
Global warming  
Carbon footprint  
CO2 (carbon dioxide) emissions  
Biodiversity’   
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Table 6: Knowledge about climate change by social class 
Social class  
Knowledge about climate change 
A B C1 C2 D E 
Know a great deal or a 
fair amount 
% within social 
class  
80.3% 71.3% 54.0% 42.7% 29.8% 29.6% 
Know not very much 
or nothing 
% within social 
class  
19.7% 28.7% 46.0% 57.3% 70.2% 70.4% 
 
Total N 66 574 911 627 507 351 
 
Binary logistic regression, modelling class and education separately, shows that both 
have significant effects, but that, modelling both together, the effect of class 
diminishes when education is introduced, suggesting that this time education has the 
greater effect4.  
 
Differences between men and women in claimed knowledge 
Regardless of education, or social class, there is a marked difference between men 
and women, with 57% of men compared to 40% of women claiming to know a lot or 
a fair amount about climate change.  
 
Table 7: Knowledge about climate change by sex of respondent  
Sex of respondent 
Knowledge about climate change 
Male Female Total 
Know a great deal or a fair amount 
 
% within Sex of respondent 57.5% 40.7% 1474 
Know not very much or nothing % within Sex of respondent 42.5% 59.3% 1558 
 
Total Count 1432 1600 3032 
 
When social class, education, sex and age are modelled together, the results indicate 
that education and sex are the more powerful explanatory factors, and are independent 
of each other in their effect, both remaining significant while social class, and 
especially age, weaken.  
 
Models do not of course in themselves provide an explanation for this pattern, but 
they are indicative. Knowledge claims are likely to vary depending on a respondent’s 
                                                
4 For example, the beta coefficient for the lowest social class reduces from 2.289 to 
1.232 when education is included in the model, whereas the coefficient for lowest 
educational level reduces from 2.218 to 1.804 under the impact of social class.  
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imagined ‘reference group’. Someone with basic knowledge might say that they 
‘knew a fair amount’ if their implicit comparison was with a presumed wider public 
with limited knowledge, or conversely that they knew ‘not very much’ if their implicit 
comparison was with an expert group. The difference between men and women may 
suggest a cultural gender difference where men are more likely to claim to be 
knowledgeable than women, regardless of the topic, or it might mean that they have 
different reference groups in mind, or indeed that men are more likely than women to 
have greater knowledge. A similar process may operate in relation to social class and 
education, with the more educationally qualified and those in higher social classes 
expressing more confidence in their claim to knowledge. 
 
Overall however the fact that over half (52%) of the Scottish sample (in comparison 
with 40% of the English sample) claimed to know ‘not very much’ or nothing at all 
about climate change, including one quarter of those educated to degree level and 
59% of women, highlights the need for high profile, accessible education about 
climate change, its causes, its likely consequences and the associated policies for 
change in energy demand and efficiency, and the plans for low carbon energy supply. 
Without public engagement, willing participation in measures to reduce carbon 
emissions will be limited. 
 
Who Do People Trust to Provide Information? 
Survey results suggest that effective education about climate change is not however 
simply a matter of government providing information to a receptive public. Very few 
people cite government publications or leaflets (11%), or government websites (3%) 
as key sources of information. Instead TV and radio news (69% of respondents 
mention these), and documentaries (57%) are dominant, with around 30% mentioning 
either broadsheet or tabloid newspapers. The sources regarded as most important were 
also radio and TV news (36%) or documentaries (29%), while government 
publications, leaflets or websites were referred to as the most important source by less 
than 1%.  
 
Independent scientists are the group most likely to be trusted to provide correct 
information, cited by 45% of respondents, in comparison with government scientists 
cited by 9%. Those least trusted were the UK government, and tabloid newspapers, 
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each cited by 34%. In comparison, the Scottish government was least trusted by 17% 
and most trusted by 12%.  
 
The implications of these findings are that influential routes to education about 
climate change for the majority are likely to be TV and radio news and 
documentaries, which are grounded in evidence from independent scientists, whose 
sources of financial support are also made public. A public sceptical of government 
motives seems unlikely to be convinced simply by government information and social 
marketing. Limited trust suggests that government-coordinated projects to improve 
understanding about climate change, and its social and economic consequences, need 
to be part of wider ambitions to strengthen participative democracy, treating 
engagement as two-way, dynamic and dispersed, and not as a one-way flow of 
information from sender to receiver.  
 
Personal Responsibility and Climate Change  
The first report of the UK Committee on Climate Change (2008) estimates that 
domestic heating and electricity account for around 25% of total UK carbon 
emissions, with private domestic transport accounting for a further 24%. The Scottish 
Climate Change Delivery Plan (2009) sets 2020 targets for around a 40% reduction 
(from 2006 levels) in emissions from energy use in housing, and around 30% 
reduction in emissions from private transport. Meeting the early reductions set by 
carbon budgets in Scotland in the next decade will therefore depend heavily on 
significant changes in behaviour at household level through shifts in consumption, 
ranging from car travel to domestic energy use, to shopping and leisure activities.   
 
There is a considerable gap however between the reductions notionally targeted by 
legislation and the awareness and preparedness of people to make such changes. Most 
people do see climate change as a cause for concern: 85% disagreed that ‘Climate 
change will only have an impact on other countries, there is no need for me to worry’ 
and 57% agreed that climate change is an immediate and urgent problem (Davidson et 
al 2009: 47-48). In disagreeing with the statement that ‘it’s not worth me doing things 
to help with the environment if others don’t do the same’, around two thirds (68%) 
also indicated that they were willing to act, even if others did not. When this is 
translated more directly into a sense of personal responsibility for action over climate 
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change however, slightly less than half (48%) relate climate change to their own 
lifestyle, and around one third distance themselves from responsibility, with 35% 
agreeing with the statement ‘I don’t believe my behaviour and everyday lifestyle 
contribute to climate change’, and a further 17% adopting a neutral position. The 
belief that personal behaviour does not contribute is somewhat higher in Scotland 
than England, where 28% of respondents to the Defra 2009 survey regarded their own 
behaviour as irrelevant5.  
 
It might be expected that those for whom the environment is salient would be more 
likely to see their own activities as implicated, and this expectation is broadly 
confirmed, with 56-60% of this group disagreeing with the statement ‘I don’t believe 
my behaviour and everyday lifestyle contribute to climate change’. Nevertheless over 
one-quarter of those for whom the environment is salient share the view that their 
own behaviour is not a contributory factor.  
 
 Table 7: Percentage disagreeing with the statement: ‘I Don’t Believe my 
Behaviour and Everyday Lifestyle Contribute to Climate Change’ by Salience of 
Environment 
Salience of Environment 
 
% 
disagreeing 
Environment important issue in Scotland 60% 
 
Environment an important issue in World 56% 
 
Environment not mentioned 42% 
 
Total N Disagreeing 1287 
 
 
When asked about likely causes of climate change, very few respondents referred 
spontaneously to household contributions, with only 5% mentioning domestic use of 
gas and electricity, suggesting that most people do not make an immediate connection 
to domestic consumption of energy, although a higher proportion (35%) mention 
‘general emissions including those from cars and road transport’. 
 
                                                
5 Both SEABS08 and Defra 2009 survey items used the same wording. 
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Other survey findings confirm this picture. Relatively low awareness of energy 
efficiency and energy saving is common, suggesting that people do not routinely 
connect domestic energy use with climate change: typically less than half the 
respondents for example knew the efficiency rating of recently bought electrical 
appliances such as fridges, freezers and washing machines. The majority (55% of 
electricity users and 58% of gas users) estimated that they were using the same 
amount of gas and electricity as in the previous year, and among the 21% who 
estimated that they were using less, only 16% of electricity users and 13% of gas 
users cited environmental concerns as the reason. Routine reliance on car travel even 
for short distances is very common, such that 44% of car users living within a mile of 
their workplace drove to work. Neither does concern about the environment translate 
into less car use, as shown by the regression analysis carried out by Davidson et al 
(2009: 50). 
 
Altogether there remain significant gaps between the acknowledgement of climate 
change as important and the recognition of any personal responsibility to make 
changes; and between recognition of the personal contribution of ‘normal 
consumption’ and actual changes in behaviour.  
 
Interpreting Responses to the Question ‘Which two or three of the actions on this list 
do you think would do the most to help reduce climate change?’ 
All survey respondents who said that they knew at least something about climate 
change (N=2699) were shown a list of 14 actions6 and asked to indicate the two or 
three which they thought were most likely to reduce it. The most common actions 
cited were recycling (45%), avoiding waste (36%) and using a more fuel efficient car 
(32%), while using less electricity was nominated by around one quarter (24%) and 
taking fewer foreign holidays by only 12%.  
 
                                                
6 Actions Listed: Recycling, Buying fewer products generally, Avoiding creating waste in the first 
place, Making fewer car journeys, Using less electricity, Taking fewer foreign holidays, Walking or 
cycling, Using public transport, Buying locally grown food rather than food produced abroad, People 
having fewer children, Using a more fuel efficient car, Reusing bottles/containers, Using water 
sparingly, Buying organic produce, None of these, Don’t know, Refused. 
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This pattern of answers can be interpreted in a variety of ways. First, the responses 
can be seen as evidence that provision of a public infrastructure, in this case kerbside 
recycling, which makes change practical, convenient and low cost, has an impact on 
understanding and behaviour. Actual patterns of use of kerbside recycling support this 
view: between 66% and 80% of those with access to the services always or mostly use 
them. Even when the actions required are very simple however, between 13% and 
25% choose not to act. It may be that some of them use very few bottles, cans or 
paper, with others perhaps resistant to separating their waste into different categories 
for collection. 
 
Table 8: Use of Kerbside Recycling Facilities  
 
Always Most 
times 
Sometimes Rarely Never Don't  
know 
N  
 
Bottle 60  
 
6 5 3 25 1 1,967 
Can 63 5  
 
5  3  22  1 2,217 
Paper 76 
  
4 4 2 13 0 
 
2,699 
Garden 
waste*  
72  
 
6 6 2 13 0 1,894 
(*those with gardens) Source: Davidson et al (2009) p.61. 
A second, less sanguine, interpretation of responses to the question about actions 
likely to reduce climate change is that they reflect an assumption that minor 
adaptations to existing habits will be sufficient. Given that the most commonly cited 
action was recycling (45%), this could be taken as evidence of a belief that little 
change is needed, as long as waste is recycled. Similarly the 32% nomination of 
‘using a more fuel efficient car’ may signal belief that expectations about travel and 
car use need not change, as long as future car purchases take account of fuel 
efficiency.  
 
Certainly politicians have concluded that there is limited public support for structural 
measures such as carbon taxes, or stronger regulation of businesses, which are 
perceived as risky or ‘heavy handed’. This is used to justify government adoption of a 
cautious approach (Hale, 2008), exemplified by Defra’s (2008) Framework for Pro-
Environmental Behaviours which uses current consumption patterns to argue that any 
change must ‘fit within people’s current lifestyle, even if one might aim for more 
fundamental shifts over the longer term’ (p.18). Policies then focus on social 
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marketing technologies, such as ‘choice editing’ and encouraging change through 
behavioural ‘entry points’, which seek to persuade people to make small changes such 
as remembering to switch off lights or take a shorter shower (see for example 
http://actonco2.direct.gov.uk/actonco2/home.html).  
 
Reliance on small changes reflects a voluntarist model of behaviour, and a ‘citizen 
consumer’ identity (Needham, 2003), derived from neo-liberal political-economy. 
This asserts that society is made up of rationally self-interested individuals, who are 
motivated to maximise personal short-term gain. Critiques of 1970s-style planned 
economies and market regulation, such as those by Friedrich von Hayek, and a 
sceptical public, distrustful of politicians, have been influential in the reluctance of 
governments to use direct taxation and regulation to shape the framework of 
incentives and disincentives. Responsibility is attributed instead to individuals in 
making their own choices, limiting the responsibility of elected government to an 
enabling, rather than an explicitly structural, role in the direction of society. Social 
marketing has however had limited impact in comparison with the significant 
commercial marketing budgets of large-scale retail. Healthy eating campaigns for 
example have correlated with rising rates of obesity (Haslam et al 2006). At best such 
campaigns are slow to effect measurable change, suggesting that the little by little 
approach may operate as a self-fulfilling prophecy, because it implicitly promotes the 
belief that small changes are sufficient, when in fact more radical action is needed.  
 
In addition empirical evidence from evaluation studies of the ‘small steps’ model, 
reviewed by Thøgersen and Crompton (2009) on behalf of WWF, suggests that there 
is no dependable link from ‘simple and painless’ change to progressively greater 
commitment to more major change: ‘the cumulative impact of large numbers of 
individuals making marginal improvements in their environmental impact will be a 
marginal collective improvement in environmental impact’ (Thøgersen and 
Crompton, 2009: 6). Similarly David MacKay, the Cambridge Physicist appointed in 
2009 as a UK government Department of Energy and Climate Change scientific 
adviser, concludes from his evaluation of the balance between UK energy 
consumption and the potential for energy supply from non-fossil fuel sources: ‘Don’t 
be distracted by the myth that “every little helps.” If everyone does a little, we’ll 
achieve only a little. We must do a lot. What’s required are big changes in demand 
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and in supply’ (MacKay, 2009: 114).  
 
Hence a third interpretation of the responses to this survey question concerns the 
assumptions behind the framing of the item itself, which invited answers focusing on 
individual actions. Although the question gave respondents an opportunity to say 
‘none of these’, the way it was framed excluded answers which prioritise shared 
responsibility through, for example, use of government powers of regulation in 
relation to fossil fuel production, energy supply, building standards, manufactured 
goods or environmental pollution. Neither did it provide an opportunity for a 
respondent to identify investment in low-carbon infrastructure for public transport, 
micro-generation schemes, or the development of a smart electricity grid, as an 
important action.  
 
High levels of household energy and car use certainly indicate that reducing domestic 
consumption will be necessary in order to meet interim emissions targets, but there 
are serious limits to what can be achieved by individuals: given a reasonable income, 
and a degree of control over time use, an individual might choose not to drive a car, or 
to travel less or use trains instead of planes, or to insulate their house and grow 
vegetables, but these ‘choices’ are made difficult by the systematic incentives and 
constraints of a consumer society: time has become a commodity for spending and 
saving; public transport is often the more expensive choice and requires more time; 
flights may be cheaper and faster than trains; employment, housing and domestic 
situation may work to increase car dependence, and prevailing social norms valorise 
spending and consuming more not less. Even assuming willingness to reduce 
consumption, individuals on their own cannot decide to improve public transport, 
restrict airport expansion, increase fuel taxes or end subsidies for fossil fuel. There is 
also evidence that, given the global impacts of climate change, people feel strongly 
about the need for governments to take the lead (Giddens, 2009). Government powers 
of regulation and taxation create the framework of costs and benefits within which 
businesses operate, and individuals make choices. These structural issues raise 
questions about the political analysis and understanding behind the legislation, and 
are indicative of the contradictions between the primary value placed on maximising 
economic growth through consumption on the one hand, and policies to cut carbon 
emissions on the other. 
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Societal Barriers to Reducing Consumption 
Consumption patterns in affluent societies are typically attributed to individual 
preferences, stemming from hedonism, escapism, quest for novelty, and desire for 
social status (Belk et al 2003; Offer, 2006), but these are socially-organised values 
learnt through interaction, and are not inevitably given expression through the 
purchase of consumer artefacts. Their meanings are derived from the social relations 
in which actions are embedded, and these are the economic relations of a consumer 
society, constituting a systematic framework of incentives to consume more. 
Economic growth in the UK since 1990 has been stimulated by rapid expansion of 
consumer credit, premised on rising housing prices: personal debt has doubled in less 
than a decade, to around £1.5 trillion in 2008, a figure higher than UK annual GDP 
(Jackson, 2009). Marketing and advertising drive dominant messages about the value 
of consuming more, sometimes resulting in apparently contradictory incentives such 
as in the recent Tesco campaign to persuade people to switch to low energy light 
bulbs, and then reward themselves with cheap flights! The power and persuasiveness 
of transnational retail over social values is apparent: Tesco for example has sales of 
around £1bn per week, with approximately £1 in every £7/£8 spent in Britain going 
through Tesco checkouts, and the company broke British retail records with over 
£3bn profits in 2009. 
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Iconic products such as the car have become key aspects of social identity, both 
practically as a means of participating in society and symbolically as a marker of 
status, values and priorities: large cars are commonly a source of prestige, even 
though they are criticised on environmental grounds and pose dangers to pedestrians 
and cyclists (Amin and Thrift 2004). Unrestricted car use is widely accepted: even 
among those SEABS08 respondents who regarded the environment as a salient issue, 
45-48% agreed that ‘people should be allowed to use their cars as much as they like’, 
and this was even higher (57%) among those for whom environmental issues were not 
salient.  
 
Increasing car ownership paradoxically limits the choice of alternative means of 
travel: urban and rural infrastructures are built increasingly around car use, and road 
networks, parking provision and traffic flow engineering are central concerns of 
governments and industries. British government spending on roads in 2009 was 
budgeted at £10.2 billion, reinforcing the centrality of the car, increasing transport 
emissions and public health problems, and thereby reducing the amount of money 
available for spending on parks, gardens, forests and waterways (Vidal, 2009). Car 
use has been further reinforced by government incentives to buy new cars in a scheme 
offering £2,000 towards the cost, when trading in a vehicle more than 10 years old, 
and plans for road-user charging have been deferred, because of the opposition 
represented by 1.8 million signatures on an e-petition on the www.number10.gov.uk 
website. This stance is reflected in the 55% of SEABS08 respondents who opposed 
congestion charging.  As John Urry has pointed out:  
‘the car system is a Janus-faced creature, extending individuals into realms of 
freedom and ﬂexibility but also constraining them to live spatially stretched and 
time-compressed lives...Yet in order to cope with the ‘mass’ adoption of 
individualised automobility, a systemic assemblage of artefacts, support and 
forms of governance are required’ (Urry, 2008: 344). 
 
Current consumption patterns arguably reflect a kind of ‘banal consumerism’, 
organised, as the SEABS08 results show, around convenience, cost and a perceived 
lack of alternatives. Most people rely on buying their food in supermarkets, with over 
half doing most of their grocery shopping there, while those most concerned about 
environmental issues are paradoxically the heaviest users of air travel (presumably 
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related to their generally higher income level) (Davidson et al 2009). Even small 
changes in consumer artefacts may produce social dissent: the recent government 
decision to withdraw incandescent light bulbs gradually from the market for example 
produced media suggestions of ‘public revolt’ – 
 
 
 
Once in place, such a system is a material and cultural barrier to change. Higher 
consumption however produces higher carbon emissions: cars, phones, computers, 
TVs, fridge-freezers and so on rely on energy-intensive manufacturing and consume 
energy in use. Direct production-based carbon emissions per capita in Scotland are 
around 8.2 tonnes CO2e per annum, compared with UK per capita emissions of 9.7 
tonnes, an American average of 19.8 tonnes, and a Chinese average of 4.6 tonnes, 
while the average Kenyan manages on 0.3 tonnes (UNHDR 2007/08). These figures 
do not include emissions embedded in artefacts manufactured in one country and 
consumed in another. Since the UK is a net importer of manufactured goods, a 
consumption-based account (using data on carbon embedded in imported products 
and in their transport) suggests that UK emissions have increased since 1990 by 
around 19% (Helm et al, 2007), and that per capita emissions are around twice the 
reported figure http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/8283909.stm (accessed 9/10/09).  
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The Significance of Social Values in the Amelioration of Climate Change 
Historically societies have responded differentially to natural resource crises and 
environmental degradation, depending on the values and beliefs enacted through their 
political, economic and social institutions (Diamond, 2007). Modern societies are 
organised around the core values of economic growth as the means to current and 
future material wealth and human well-being. The effect has been to locate debates 
about the mitigation of climate change firmly in the realm of a calculative economics, 
with opponents of mitigation (such as former US President George W Bush) arguing 
that such actions would have an unjustifiable negative economic impact. Cost benefit 
analysis (CBA), which is a significant economic tool of climate policy, is a powerful 
symbol of the underlying values informing debate about mitigation. CBA techniques 
allocate a monetary value to all activities and resources, enabling them to be made 
theoretically commensurable with one another: monetary transfers enabled by 
anticipated future economic growth may be treated as adequate substitutes for 
anticipated permanent loss of natural resources or ecosystems (Hulme, 2009). CBA 
inevitably entails value judgements by its users, particularly in relation to climate 
change where calculations cannot be based on historical observations of actual events, 
but are devised in the face of enormous uncertainty about potentially extreme 
consequences of increasing global temperatures. These include judgements about loss 
of life in the face of resource conflict, disease, drought, flooding, crop failure, loss of 
species and so on. The CBA ‘discount rate’ metric treats spending to mitigate future 
climate change as a loss of current welfare, which may not be justified by the value 
added to the welfare of future generations. Use of a discount rate which treats future 
generations as equally important to the current one, as in the Stern Review (2006), has 
however been criticised on the grounds that foregoing consumption now for the sake 
of future generations will mean less for today’s poor (Pearce, 2003).  
 
Treating society, economy and environment as aligned along a single scale of 
monetary value may hence make it seem that there is a conflict between prioritising 
present welfare and prioritising the mitigation of climate change. Economic growth is 
conventionally viewed as fundamental to ending poverty, so that calls to limit growth 
and consumption are seen as undermining the momentum to address poverty (Hodder 
and Martin, 2009; Hulme, 2009). There is however increasing evidence that the high 
value placed on economic growth per se as serving the interests of both present and 
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future generations, and as key to solving global poverty is wrong. In the last 20-25 
years, the global economy has doubled, and employment has increased, but income 
inequality has risen dramatically and the UN Human Development Index shows that 
between 1990 and 2003 there were unprecedented reversals in welfare for the 460 
million people in 18 of the poorest countries (UNHDR, 2005). Moreover ‘in the midst 
of an increasingly prosperous global economy... more than 1 billion people survive in 
abject poverty on less than $1 a day’ (UN Human Development Report, 2005: 17). 
Neither has increasing affluence, measured as growth in GDP and per capita income, 
correlated with steadily increasing life satisfaction (Inglehart and Klingemann, 2000; 
Jackson, 2009). Rising income inequality in societies such as the UK and USA does 
however correlate with increasing drug and alcohol abuse, obesity, mental health 
problems and suicide, as well as shorter life expectancy and lower educational 
achievement (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009).  
 
The doubling of the global economy since 1990 (the Kyoto base year) has also been 
accompanied by a significant rise in global carbon emissions of around 40%, evidence 
of accelerating global warming, and further degradation of ecosystems on which some 
of the poorest populations depend for food and water (Jackson, 2009; OECD, 2008; 
Torres, 2008; UN Human Development Reports 2005, 2006 and 2007/08). The 
current crisis in financial markets has triggered a major global recession, adding to 
evidence that the belief in unlimited growth in deregulated markets as a means to 
human welfare is deeply flawed.  
 
Can Liberal Democracies Work to Change Dominant Values? 
The combined impact of pluralist politics, materialistic values and commitment to 
unlimited economic growth poses questions about whether liberal democracies can 
successfully mitigate climate change (Giddens, 2009; Shearman and Smith, 2007). 
Among the affluent democratic societies, Sweden is generally cited as having the 
strongest stance on cutting emissions, and this has been attributed to its more 
egalitarian values, and beliefs that the environment, society and economy are integral 
parts of wellbeing. Prompted by OPEC oil price increases, energy efficiency has been 
a matter of public concern since the 1970s. The introduction of a carbon tax in 1991 
increased fuel costs (although many key industries receive tax relief or are exempted), 
and created incentives for investment in district heating schemes, low carbon heat 
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pumps and other energy efficiency measures (Fouche, 2008). Sweden is noted for 
having the first biogas train, and for using biofuels, sourced from wood chips and 
other waste, in 15% of vehicles. Car dependency however remains part of life in 
Sweden just as it is in the UK, and although measured emissions reductions between 
1990 and 2006 are stated as 9%, to around 5.6 tonnes CO2e per capita per annum, if 
the emissions embedded in imported consumer products were included, its per capita 
emissions are likely to be considerably higher. Nevertheless the Swedish form of 
corporatist governance, an organised civil society, and social democratic, egalitarian 
values have enabled the adoption of a programme for an oil-free economy by 2020, 
with government, industrialists, academics, agriculturalists and civil society sharing 
responsibility for action (BBC news Wednesday, 8 February 2006 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/4694152.stm).  
 
The Swedish case suggests that in liberal democracies, government regulation to 
provide an appropriate framework of incentives is a necessary means of building on 
and reinforcing core values. Multi-level government, deregulated finance and 
powerful transnational business interests in Europe, mean that neither EU member 
states nor devolved governments have sole control of economic, social and 
environmental regulation. Competition, trade and industrial policies are governed at 
European, as well as UK and Scottish, levels, with economic policy shaped by 
deregulated finance capital. The policy-making arena is complex, but this makes the 
articulation of distinct policy and innovative action by devolved governments more 
important, because democratic societies have the capacity to mobilise significant 
resources. The expectation that devolved government in Scotland would stimulate a 
more progressive politics has not been fulfilled as yet: ‘there has been a disappointing 
absence of policy debate and innovation’ (Keating, 2007: 9). There remains a vital 
role for ‘devolved thinking’ about a distinctive Scottish rationale for action, 
potentially challenging the liberal individualism of Anglo-American market 
capitalism. This requires the active civil society and participative social democracy 
envisaged by the Scottish Constitutional Convention, and embodied in the principles 
devised by the Consultative Steering Group for a Scottish Parliament.   
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Political engagement, as a significant constituent of change in democracies, requires 
willingness by elected politicians to debate the social costs and consequences of 
current values. The exercise of political leadership that stimulates support across 
business, public services and civil society, requires not just courage and political 
acumen, but also willingness to lead by example. This means adopting highly visible 
measures demonstrating reduced consumption of energy, practicing sustainable 
procurement of goods, services and buildings, prioritising reuse and recycling, and 
cutting inessential air and road travel. The Scottish government has the advantage of 
being somewhat more trusted than the UK government as a source of information on 
climate change: 12% would trust it most, compared with 10% trusting the UK 
government most, while 17% would trust the Scottish government least, in 
comparison with 34% who would trust the UK government least. So far however the 
record of leading by example to reduce carbon emissions is limited. The annual report 
on environmental performance of Scottish government buildings saw an increase in 
energy use of 2.5% in the previous year (Audit Scotland Energy Efficiency report, 
2009) and the first report of the government’s Council of Economic Advisers (2008) 
comments that practical measures are needed if a substantive contribution is to be 
made by government to cut emissions between 2010 and 2020.  
 
Changing Values through Mobilising Civil Society  
The most significant shifts in social values seem likely to come about through civil 
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society influencing government: ‘People are neither willing nor able to take decisive 
action alone on an issue of this scale and complexity. But they will very often do so if 
they have opportunities to act in concert with others’ (Hale, 2008: 3). Social 
movement and civil society organisations and NGOs, from Stop Climate Chaos to the 
Women’s Institute and Christian Aid, have already been instrumental in shaping the 
strong climate change legislation in Scotland and the UK. The Transition Towns 
movement (www.transitiontowns.org), with 94 Transition Towns, Villages, Cities and 
Islands in the UK and a further 40 around the world, is also a prominent community 
actor, working to facilitate social transition to a low-carbon economy (Seyfang, 
2009). Support for the view that involvement in civil society leads to perceived 
responsibility to act can be inferred from SEABS08 evidence that volunteering per se 
is associated with a sense of responsibility for public issues such as climate change: 
out of the one third of respondents involved in volunteer activity in the past year, the 
majority believed that their behaviour contributed to climate change, in comparison 
with less than half of the non-volunteers (57% of active volunteers rejected the 
statement that their behaviour and lifestyle did not contribute to climate change, in 
comparison with 45% of those who were not involved in volunteer activity).  
 
Recent government strategies also recognise the potential for civil society to create 
momentum for change. Although UK sustainable development strategy is couched in 
the voluntarist language of ‘helping people make better choices’, its lead measure for 
achieving this is a programme of community engagement: ‘Community Action 2020 
– Together We Can’ (Securing the Future: UK Government Sustainable Development 
Strategy, 2005) explicitly builds on the role of civil society in reshaping consumption. 
In Scotland the potential for community action to stimulate change has been 
recognised by the Climate Challenge Fund, with a budget of £27.4m over three years. 
Proposed by the Green Party during the 2007 Scottish Parliamentary elections, it was 
adopted by the Scottish Government as part of 2008 budget negotiations, and provides 
investment in community projects to reduce carbon emissions. Moreover the 2009 
DFID White Paper ‘Eliminating World Poverty’ is subtitled ‘our common future’, 
makes reference to the common good, and includes reference to the critical role of 
civil society organisations in campaigning for change and delivering support. 
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Conclusion 
Public attitudes and behaviour in Scotland can be interpreted as moving towards 
acceptance of the urgency of action, or more pessimistically as only partially 
recognising the significance of climate change for the security and welfare of society. 
For many people, climate change remains a distant issue, and there is little evidence 
of broad public engagement with the targets set by climate change legislation, which 
require substantial reductions in domestic GHG emissions between now and 2020. 
Concern about environmental resources and knowledge about climate change are 
unevenly distributed in the population. Those in higher socio-economic groups, and 
those with higher levels of education, show most awareness, but this does not 
translate into reduced consumption and energy saving. Only around half of the 
population regard their own lifestyle as directly contributing, and this is only slightly 
higher among those expressing concern about environmental issues. Even fewer 
people make a direct connection between climate change and personal consumption, 
car and energy use. The reliance by government on social marketing and individual 
small changes may be contributing to a belief that minor shifts in lifestyle, such as 
recycling more waste, will be sufficient. There are therefore major demands on 
democratic governance, not least in the immediate needs for public education and 
debate, and in the need to address the gap between general public concern and 
specific recognition of the necessary changes in domestic consumption. The scale of 
change envisaged cannot be achieved through relying on the sum of possible 
individual choices; in addition to extensive public engagement, it requires 
governments to use all of their powers of regulation to change the framework of price 
incentives, and to encourage private capital into low-carbon investment.  
 
The current economic crisis is an opportunity to rethink the core values of deregulated 
markets, consumerism and intensive exploitation of resources for short-term 
economic growth. The Reith Lectures, 2009, given by Michael Sandel, Professor of 
Government at Harvard, drew attention specifically to the prospects of a new politics 
for the common good:   
‘Some of the good things in life are corrupted or degraded if turned into 
commodities, so to decide when to use markets, it’s not enough to think about 
efficiency; we have also to decide how to value the goods in question. Health, 
education, national defence, criminal justice, environmental protection and so 
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on – these are moral and political questions, not merely economic ones… 
without ever deciding to do so, we drifted from having a market economy to 
being a market society’ (Sandel, 2009: 10). 
Market society has been associated with rising global inequality, economic instability, 
and financial and ecological crisis. Around $7 trillion of public money has been 
committed to securitise risky assets and recapitalise banks, but there is as yet limited 
political momentum over future alternatives which face up to the severe failure of this 
set of core values as a means to solve the combined problems of debt, poverty, 
conflict and climate change. Current public finances depend on perpetual GDP 
growth to maintain employment and public spending, and to manage macroeconomic 
relations, and at present there is no alternative politically accepted macroeconomic 
model for sustainability (Jackson, 2009). In these circumstances, finding the political 
courage to engage the public in debate about the kinds of social transformations 
needed to meet commitments in climate change legislation is understandably 
challenging.  
  
Moves towards sustainable resource use require a participative politics grounded in 
civil society, which can facilitate engagement across entrenched divisions, manage 
distributional conflicts and recognise the damage to prosperity from current market 
forms. Climate change is not ‘just an environmental matter’; it is already a cause of 
conflict, disease, famine, poverty and death, and will become more so. Scotland’s 
Climate Change legislation demands a transformational politics able to debate the 
long-term common good, not one of incremental change and individualism. Without 
this, the ambition to govern climate is likely to be more symbolic than substantive.  
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